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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Priority No. 2 
v. : 
MARVIN NEWELL GREEN, : Case No. 981332-CA 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals a final order of dismissal in a prosecution for possession of 
cocaine in a drug free zone, an enhanced second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 58-37-8(5)(vi) (1996); and possession of paraphernalia in a 
drug free zone, an enhanced class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§58-
37a-5 and 58-37-8(5)(vi) (1996). 
These counts were dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the trial court's order 
suppressing evidence which rendered the State unable to proceed. See State v. Troyer, 
866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993). The State's appeal is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-
l(2)(a) (1995 & Supp. 1998). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e)( 1996). 
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ISSUES PRESENTED AND PRESERVED ON APPEAL, 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1(a). Did the trial court err as a matter of law in finding that a level one, 
voluntary police-citizen contact was transformed into a level two seizure by the 
officer's requests to see defendant's identification and to run a warrants check? 
(b). If not, did the trial court err as a matter of law in finding that the seizure 
was unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminality? 
A "bifurcated" review standard applies to these issues. Underlying fact findings 
are reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." The court's conclusions of 
law, however, are reviewed for correctness, allowing some "measure of discretion" as 
regards the application of legal standards to the facts. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
935-40 (Utah 1994). 
These issues were preserved below (R. 15-12), add. A; (R.38: 36-40); (R. 27-24), 
add.B. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine in a drug free zone, an 
enhanced second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 
58-37-8(5)(vi) (1996), possession of paraphernalia in a drug free zone, an enhanced class 
A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37a-5(a) and 58-37-8(5)(vi) 
(1996) (R. 2-1).1 Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized from his person and 
vehicle pursuant to a warrantless search incident to his arrest on outstanding warrants (R. 
15-10) (copies of the motion and supporting memorandum are contained in addendum A). 
Following an evidentiary hearing (R. 38) (a copy of the transcript of the hearing held 2 
April 1998, is attached as addendum B), the trial court granted defendant's motion (R. 27-
24) (a copy of the Memorandum Decision is contained in addendum C). Because the 
State was unable to proceed without the suppressed evidence, the trial court dismissed 
with prejudice the above charges (R. 32-29). The State filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 
34-33). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Investigation of Broken Window 
At approximately 10:30 p.m. on 3 January 1998, Officer Robert Edwards of the 
Springville Police Department investigated a broken window in Springville, Utah (R. 
]The record is numbered in reverse chronological order. 
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38:9), add. B.2 Two blocks from the site of the recently shattered window, the officer saw 
defendant sitting alone in an older model Chevy which was parked in a church parking lot 
(R. 3: 3), add. B. The Chevy was parked approximately 100 yards from the church 
building "partway in the drive-through and partway [] into a stall[,]" and approximately 
ten feet from the stall curb (R. 38: 5-7). No other cars were in the lot (R. 38: 5), add. B. 
Voluntary Encounter 
Officer Edwards pulled to the right side of defendant's Chevy, leaving an 
approximate 20 to 25 foot distance between the two vehicles (R. 38: 7-8), add. B. In so 
doing, the officer did not activate his emergency or spot lights (id). As Officer Edwards 
walked toward the Chevy he saw that the license plates had expired two years earlier (R. 
38: 8-9, 19), add. B. He also noticed that defendant was "moving around a lot[:] He 
wasn't like sitting in one place. He would lean to one side or to the other. You could see 
his arms were moving" (id.). 
Officer Edwards tapped on defendant's window which defendant slowly rolled 
down and the officer asked if he was okay (R. 38:9-10), add. B. Defendant did not 
respond for 45 to 60 seconds and then asked the officer if he was doing anything wrong 
(id.). Officer Edwards assured defendant that he was not, and that he was just checking to 
2A hearing on defendant's motion to suppress was held on 2 April 1998. The 
cover page of the suppression hearing transcript is numbered "38." The subsequent pages 
retain their original numbering. Therefore, pages of that transcript will be numbered in 
this brief as "R. 38: [internal page number]." 
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see if defendant was okay (id.). The officer also asked defendant if he had seen anyone 
come through the parking lot in the last few minutes (id.). Defendant delayed in 
answering and then replied that he was just listening to his radio (id.)} 
Defendant Consents to Officer's Requests for Identification 
and for Permission to Run a Warrants Check 
The officer also asked defendant if he had any identification (R. 38: 12), add. B. 
Defendant hesitated before answering "Yes," and then slowly reached for his wallet (id.). 
The officer observed that defendant had trouble retrieving his driver's license from the 
wallet and that once it was retrieved defendant had trouble "keeping hold of it" (id.). 
When defendant handed the license to Officer Edwards, the officer had to reach down 
into the car to take the license from him (id.). Officer Edwards asked defendant if he 
"minded" if the officer took defendant's license back to the patrol car "to check on a few 
things" (R. 38: 13), add. B. Defendant said, "Okay" (id.). A warrants and license check 
revealed two outstanding warrants for defendant, that the Chevy was registered to 
someone else, and also confirmed that the Chevy's registration had expired in 1995 (R. 
38: 14, 20), add. B. Up until Officer Edwards discovered the outstanding warrants, 
defendant was free to walk away from the encounter and he was never told otherwise; 
3The record indicates that following defendant's non-responsive answer Officer 
Edwards repeated his question, but defendant's answer, if any, is not provided (id.). 
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however, if defendant had attempted to drive the Chevy away, Officer Edwards would 
have stopped him for the expired registration violation (R. 38: 29), add. B. 
Search Incident-to-Arrest on Outstanding Warrants 
Defendant was arrested on the outstanding warrants and a search of his person and 
the Chevy incident to the arrest revealed controlled substances and paraphernalia (id). 
Reasonable Suspicion of Expired Registration and DUI 
Defendant's behavior throughout the voluntary encounter caused Officer Edwards 
to be concerned that he was impaired (id.). The officer did not consider defendant's 
responses to be "normal," because they were slow, non-responsive, and because 
defendant also failed to make eye contact (R. 38: 11, 28), add. B. Defendant looked in 
the car and at his feet, even when the officer asked him for his identification (R. 38: 12), 
add. B. Ultimately, Officer Edwards did not call for a drug recognition expert (DRE) 
because he arrested defendant on the outstanding warrants, and because another officer 
later arriving at the scene informed him that defendant lived in a community center for 
mentally disabled people, to which fact Officer Edwards then attributed defendant's 
abnormal behavior (R. 38: 30-32), add. B. 
Motion to Suppress 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized on two grounds. First, 
defendant claimed that he was unreasonably seized by the facts that the officer's patrol 
car allegedly "block[ed]ff him in the church parking lot, the patrol car's headlights shined 
6 
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on the Chevy, Officer Edwards was armed and in uniform, and finally, because the officer 
"interrogated" him (R. 13), add. A. Alternatively, defendant argued that even if the 
manner in which Officer Edwards approached him did not constitute a seizure, he was 
seized as a matter of law "the moment that Officer Edwards seized [his] identification and 
returned to his patrol vehicle to run a warrants check" (id). 
Ruling 
The trial court rejected defendant's first argument, disagreeing that defendant was 
seized at any time during the officer's initial approach and questioning (R. 26), add. C. 
Specifically, the trial court found that Officer Edwards's initial approach and inquiries 
clearly constituted a voluntary or level one encounter, that "defendant responded to the 
officer's questions voluntarily," and that there was "no indication that [d]efendant wasn't 
(sic) free to leave" (id.).4 
However, the trial court accepted defendant's alternative argument, agreeing that 
defendant was seized as a matter of law when Officer Edwards "took possession" of 
defendant's license "and returned to his patrol car to run a warrants check" (R. 25), add. 
C. Even though defendant's behavior "raised some suspicion that defendant was under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol," the trial court found that the seizure was unsupported 
by reasonable suspicion because Officer Edwards "failed to administer a sobriety test or 
4See State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987). 
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take any other action to determine whether the abnormal responses were the result of 
drugs or alcohol use, or something else" (id). 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State does not dispute the trial court's findings and conclusions that the initial 
contact between Officer Edwards and defendant constituted a level one or a voluntary 
encounter which requires no Fourth Amendment justification. 
Rather, at issue here is the trial court's conclusion that the voluntary and 
consensual encounter was somehow transformed into a level two detention or seizure 
when Officer Edwards's obtained defendant's identification and ran a warrants check. 
The trial court's conclusion is incorrect as a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion 
the trial court wholly failed to review the totality of the circumstances including the 
uncontradicted evidence of an on-going consensual encounter. As a consequence, the 
trial court's ruling is inconsistent with its sketchy findings, the undisputed testimony of 
Officer Edwards, and controlling authority from the United States Supreme Court, the 
Utah Supreme Court and this Court. 
Even if Officer Edwards's requests for identification and for permission to run a 
warrants check transformed the consensual encounter into a seizure, the State further 
challenges the trial court's ruling that the seizure was unsupported by reasonable 
suspicion. At the time the officer obtained defendant's identification and ran the warrants 
8 
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check he reasonably suspected defendant had been driving a vehicle with expired 
registration and might also be physically impaired. 
Assuming the State prevails on either of the above grounds, defendant did not 
dispute below that the evidence against him was otherwise properly seized during a 
search incident to his arrest on the outstanding warrants. The Court should therefore 
reverse the trial court's order suppressing evidence and remand this case for trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
CONCLUDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS SEIZED FOR FOURTH 
AMENDMENT PURPOSES WHEN OFFICER EDWARDS 
REQUESTED HIS IDENTIFICATION AND PERMISSION TO RUN 
A WARRANTS CHECK 
A. Consensual Encounter 
The critical issue in this case is whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
concluding defendant was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when Officer Edwards 
obtained his identification and ran a warrants check (see R. 25), add. C. The trial court's 
erroneous conclusion is partially driven by its incomplete factual findings regarding the 
voluntariness of the police-citizen contact. While the trial court's factual findings are 
correct as far as they go, they overlook defendant's continuing consent to the officer's 
requests for identification and for permission to run the warrants check. The trial court's 
erroneous conclusion of seizure is further driven by its failure to consider the totality of 
the circumstances regarding the encounter, including the complete absence of any show 
9 
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of authority or use of physical force on the part of Officer Edwards. As a consequence 
the trial court's determination of a seizure is inconsistent with, and unsupported by its 
sketchy factual findings, the uncontradicted evidence below, and controlling case 
authority. It therefore "exceeds established legal boundariesM and merits no measure of 
discretion. See State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 831, 835 n. 5 (Utah App. 1995); State v. 
Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah App. 1994) (both evaluating custody determinations 
and observing that such "fact sensitive" determinations by a trial court are accorded a 
"measure of discretion," unless the determination "exceeds established legal boundaries"). 
1. Seizure Standard 
"Not every encounter between a police officer and a citizen is a seizure" requiring 
justification under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 
1994) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)). Indeed, Utah's appellate 
courts recognize three different levels of police-citizen contacts. State v. Deitman, 739 
P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987); State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994). The first 
level is a voluntary encounter which requires no Fourth Amendment justification. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437. A voluntary encounter occurs when an officer approaches and 
questions a suspect. Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617; Bean, 869 P.2d at 986. This questioning 
may even be incriminating and may also include a request for identification and for 
consent to search. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435, 439. An officer may stop and so question an 
individual at any time so long as a "reasonable person would feel free 'to disregard the 
10 
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police and go about his business.'" Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 (quoting California v. Hodari 
£>., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)). Such a voluntary "encounter will not trigger Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature." Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434. 
The second level of police-citizen encounter is a temporary seizure which does 
require Fourth Amendment justification. Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617; Bean, 869 P.2d at 
986. In order to legally effect a temporary seizure, the officer must have a reasonable 
suspicion that the suspect has committed or is about to commit a crime, and the detention 
must be limited in scope. Id. 5 "A person is seized under the Fourth Amendment when, 
considering the totality of the circumstances, the police conduct would have 
communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officer's 
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter and go about his or her business." Higgins, 
884 P.2d at 1244. Accord Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436. Relevant factors include an officer's 
use of physical force or show of authority for purposes of restraining in some way the 
liberty of the individual. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994). 
An objective assessment of this case shows that the trial court misapplied and/or 
ignored the above criteria in entering its factual findings and in concluding that defendant 
was seized any time prior to his arrest on the outstanding warrants. 
The third level of police citizen encounter, arrest, must be supported by probable 
cause, see Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-618, but is not at issue here. 
11 
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2. Incomplete Factual Findings Drive Erroneous Determination of 
Seizure 
Here, the trial court found that "Officer Edwards asked [defendant for 
identification, and [defendant produced a driver's license" (R. 27), add. C. The trial 
court also found that the officer asked defendant for "permission to return to his patrol car 
to run a warrant check" (R. 25), add. C. As far as they go, these findings are correct, but 
they are also incomplete. 
As set out in greater detail in the Statement of the Facts, defendant responded 
affirmatively to both the officer's requests for identification and for permission to "check 
on a few things" (see R. 38: 12-13), add. B. Additionally, Officer Edwards employed no 
physical force or other show of authority that would have conveyed the message to 
defendant that his compliance was required (id.). Indeed, to the extent defendant claimed 
otherwise with reference to the officer's initial approach and inquiries, the trial court 
rejected his argument (R. 26-25), add. C. In failing thereafter to acknowledge the 
officer's non-reliance on physical force or authority, and defendant's consensual 
behavior, the trial court's findings misrepresent the totality of Officer Edwards's 
uncontradicted testimony (id.). The trial court clearly accepted the officer's testimony, 
having entered no contrary finding (R. 27-24), add. C. 
12 
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3. Seizure Determination Contrary to Controlling Authority 
Not only is the trial court's seizure determination inconsistent with the undisputed 
facts of the continuing consensual nature of the encounter, it is unsupported by 
controlling authority. As emphasized in Bostick, a voluntary encounter does not "trigger" 
Fourth Amendment protections unless or until it loses its consensual nature. 501 U.S. at 
434. As demonstrated above, the instant encounter never lost its consensual nature. In 
ruling otherwise, the trial court mistakenly relied upon State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 
(Utah 1991) and State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). 
Both Johnson and Godina-Luna are immediately distinguishable from the instant 
facts on the ground that they involve traffic-stop scenarios. Therefore the police-citizen 
encounters in these cases began as level two detentions requiring Fourth Amendment 
justification from their inception. Johnson, 805 P.2d at 762; Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 
653. Police in Johnson and Godina-Luna were thus required to justify with reasonable 
suspicion of criminality, any detention of the vehicles' occupants outside the initial traffic 
purposes for the stops. Id. 
In Johnson, the supreme court found that Johnson, a passenger in the stopped 
vehicle, was unreasonably detained when the officer asked for her name and date of birth 
for purposes of running a warrants check because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion 
that the vehicle was stolen. 805 P.2d at 764. 
13 
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In Godina-Luna, this court held that the defendants were unlawfully seized when, 
after satisfying himself that defendants were not intoxicated, the officer did not return the 
car registration and other papers, but continued to investigate criminal activity of which 
he had no reasonable suspicion. 826 P.2d at 655.6 Notably, it was the not the officer's 
running of a warrants check that Godina-Luna found objectionable, but rather the 
officer's posing of the question whether the defendants' had "any alcohol, firearms, or 
drugs in the vehicle[.]M 826 P.2d at 654. 
Here, in contrast to Johnson, Godina-Luna, and every other traffic-stop case, the 
police-citizen encounter began as a voluntary encounter and continued as such until 
defendant was arrested on the outstanding warrants. Accordingly, Officer Edwards was 
not required to justify either his request for identification, Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435, or his 
request for permission to run a warrants check. See People v. Bouser, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 
163, 166 (Cal. App. 1994), cert, denied, 514 U.S. 1039 (1995) (commencing a warrants 
6Since Johnson and Godina-Luna, the Utah Supreme Court has clarified that in a 
traffic stop scenario, "running a warrants check during the course of a routine traffic stop 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment, so long as it does not significantly extend the 
period of detention beyond that reasonably necessary to request a driver's license and 
valid registration and to issue a citation." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 
1994). See also State v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Utah App.) (where police-citizen 
encounter was initially consensual, but was also supported by reasonable suspicion, it was 
unnecessary to determine when defendant was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes; 
rather, only question was whether detention for purposes of running a warrants check 
significantly extended the detention beyond that reasonably necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the initial stop), cert denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). 
14 
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check on a suspect does not automatically convert a consensual encounter into a Fourth 
Amendment seizure); State v. Soukharith, 570 N.W.2d 344, 353 (Neb. 1997) (reasonable 
suspicion not required to run a warrants check where suspect was not seized within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment). See also State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 
App. 1990) (recognizing that as a matter of law a request for identification cannot 
constitute a show of authority sufficient to convert an innocent encounter into a seizure), 
cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). Defendant was free to decline either request and 
nothing in the officer's conduct suggested otherwise. See Statement of the Facts, supra. 
In contrast to Johnson, Godina-Luna and other cases where the police-citizen 
encounter began as a level two detention, this case is more closely analogous to the 
consensual police-citizen contact upheld by the supreme court in State v. Deitman, 739 
P.2d 616 (Utah 1987). The supreme court rejected the Deitman defendants' claims that 
they were seized without probable cause when an officer asked if he could speak to them, 
and also requested their identification upon which he ran a warrants check and uncovered 
outstanding warrants. 739 P.2d at 617-18. Instead, the supreme court found the police-
citizen contact constituted a level one or voluntary encounter which required no Fourth 
Amendment justification. Id. In so ruling, the Deitman court found the officer's non-
forcefiil conduct and the defendants' willing compliance significant: "Here, defendants 
were not stopped by the officer and raised no objection when the officer asked if he could 
talk to them. They crossed the street, produced identification on request, and were not 
15 
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detained against their will." Id. at 618. In this case, defendant also willingly complied 
with Officer Edward's non-forceful requests for his identification and for permission to 
run a warrants check. See Statement of the Facts, supra. 
Based on the above, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that 
on these facts, the running of a warrants check transformed an otherwise consensual 
encounter into a level two detention requiring reasonable suspicion of criminality. 
B* Any Detention Supported by Reasonable Suspicion 
Even assuming the Court were to deem the running of a warrants check on the 
instant facts to constitute a level two detention requiring Fourth Amendment justification, 
the trial court erroneously concluded that such justification was absent here. 
There is reasonable suspicion to justify a detention if, from the facts and the 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, police would reasonably suspect that criminal 
activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Accordingly, the reasonable 
suspicion standard is "less demanding" than probable cause, requiring only "'some 
minimal level of objective justification'" for the detention. United States v. Sokolow, 490 
U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citations and quotations omitted). Accord State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 
541 (Utah App. 1990) (reasonable suspicion "must be based on objective facts suggesting 
that the individual may be involved in criminal activity"). In evaluating this minimal 
objective justification, a court must consider "the totality of the circumstances - the 
16 
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whole picture." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). As the Supreme 
Court notes: 
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. 
Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical 
people formulated certain common sense conclusions about human 
behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same - and so are law 
enforcement officers. 
Id. at 418. 
Here, the record establishes that at the time Officer Edwards requested defendant's 
identification and permission to run the warrants check, he reasonably suspected 
defendant had committed or was about to commit a class C misdemeanor offense, driving 
a vehicle with expired registration (R. 38: 8,18-19), add. B. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 
41-la-1303 (Supp. 1998) (prohibiting the driving upon any highway of the state of any 
vehicle required to be registered in this state that is not registered or for which the 
required fee has not been paid). The officer's testimony that he observed the substantially 
expired registration upon approaching defendant's Chevy in the church parking lot is 
uncontested. See Statement of the Facts, supra. Yet, the trial court failed to consider the 
evidence in evaluating the reasonableness of the officer's conduct. The trial court's 
findings are therefore incomplete, and contribute to its erroneous determination that the 
purported seizure was made without reasonable suspicion. 
Additionally, Officer Edwards reasonably suspected defendant was physically 
impaired. Indeed, the trial court found that defendant's responses were "abnormal," "non-
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responsive and delayed," and that this behavior "raised some suspicion that the defendant 
was under the influence of drugs or alcohol" (R. 27, 25), add. C. The trial court declined 
to find, however, that these facts constituted reasonable suspicion because in its view 
Officer Edwards "did nothing further to confirm or deny his suspicion. He failed to 
administer a sobriety test" (R. 25), add. C. The trial court's findings are again incomplete 
for their failure to recognize the officer's uncontradicted testimony that he declined to 
fiirther pursue his suspicion of DUI only after learning that defendant was mentally 
disabled, and after determining to arrest defendant on the outstanding warrants (R. 38: 31-
32), add. B. Defendant's "abnormal" behavior may not have amounted to probable cause 
to arrest for DUI, but it certainly warranted the minimal detention found to have occurred 
here. The trial court's contrary conclusion is erroneous and should be overturned. 
* * * 
For the reasons detailed above, on these facts, the trial court erred as a matter of 
law in concluding that defendant was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when the 
officer obtained his identification and ran a warrants check. Even if a seizure is deemed 
to have occurred, the trial court further erred in concluding that the seizure was 
unsupported by reasonable suspicion of a registration violation and/or possible DUI. The 
trial court's erroneous conclusions are driven by its incomplete factual findings 
overlooking the officer's uncontradicted testimony as to the voluntary and consensual 
nature of the police-citizen contact, and his reasons for not further investigating his 
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suspicion defendant was physically impaired. The trial court's erroneous conclusions 
also result from its misapprehension of controlling authority. As a result, the trial court's 
determinations of seizure, and of no reasonable suspicion, exceed legal boundaries and 
merit no measure of discretion. The ruling below should be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the trial court's suppression of defendant's statements 
and remand this case for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on _Q October 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
7M 
/MARIAN DECKER Assistant Attorney General 
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Randall K. Spencer (6992) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys for Defendant 
245 North University Avenue 
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Telephone 379-2570 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
MARVIN NEWELL GREEN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. 981403433 
JUDGE RAY M. HARDING 
Defendant, MARVIN NEWELL GREEN, through his counsel of record, Randall K. 
Spencer, hereby moves the Court pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of Defendant's 
person and automobile. Additionally, Defendant respectfully requests an evidentiary hearing 
on his motion. 
DATED this 3 ^ day of March, 1998. 
tandall K. Spencer 
Attorney for Defendant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
the Utah County Attorney, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this J(\ day of_ 
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Randall K. Spencer (6992) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys for Defendant 
245 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED f ^ W 
Fourth Judlc;* a j ^ r ? r ^ 
O f U - s h O ^ v •••*.. ~ — 
#^ l v :.-', '-< rj .*'. • ; • 
-/17 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
MARVIN NEWELL GREEN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. 981403433 
JUDGE RAY M. HARDING 
Defendant, MARVIN GREEN, through his counsel of record, Randall K. Spencer, 
hereby submits the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of his motion 
suppress evidence in the above entitled case. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On or about January 3, 1998, Defendant was parked in a private parking lot at 
approximately 10:30 in the evening. 
2. Defendant's vehicle was facing a curb which bordered some shrubbery and a fence. 
3. Officer Roger Edwards of the Springville City Police Department approached 
Defendant's vehicle, parked behind the vehicle with his headlights shining into the 
vehicle, and approached and engaged Defendant in conversation. 
4. Officer Edwards asked Defendant for identification, and Defendant produced a 
driver's license. 
5. Officer Edwards returned to his vehicle and did a warrant check on Defendant and 
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discovered outstanding warrants. 
6. Officer Edwards also noticed that the license plates on Defendant's vehicle were 
expired, but did not issue a citation because Defendant was private property, and the 
Officer knew that he could not cite Defendant for expired plates until he pulled onto 
public roads. 
7. After discovering the warrants, Officer Edwards arrested Defendant, and found 
evidence of controlled substances and paraphernalia in the search incident to arrest. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT WAS STOPPED AND SEIZED WITHOUT REASONABLE 
SUSPICION TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S DETENTION. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution contains nearly the same language as the federal 
constitution. Defendant was stopped and searched illegally under both the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution. 
The search and seizure limitations of the fourth amendment and article I, § 14 of the 
Utah Constitution are applicable to investigatory stops or seizures that are not official arrests. 
State v. Trujillo 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987). When a person remains not in the spirit 
of cooperation with an officer, but because he believes that he is not free to leave, a seizure has 
occurred. LL 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined three levels of police encounters together with 
0014 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the standard for justifying such a detention: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so 
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion 
that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the 
"detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop"; 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to 
believe an offense has been committed or is being committed. 
State v. Deitman. 739 P 2d 61 6, 61 7 18 (1 Jtah 198 7). In the present case, a to 'i ;11 w< > 
encounter occurred when Officer Edwards stopped behind Defendant's vehicle in a marked 
patrol car blocking Defendant's vehicle from immediate egress, placed the patrol vehicle such 
full uniform while carrying a firearm, and interrogated Defendant. State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 
1225 (Utah App„ 199 7); State v. Smith. / 31 P.2d 3 79 (Utah App. 1989). State v. Lopez. 783 
P.2d479(N.M \pp. 1989). A reasonable person in the suu.: • * . t Defendar; ,\a Alien 
Officer Edwards approached his vehicle would not have felt free to leave. According to 
Officer .: A. r report, it is undisputed tl lat Officer Edwards •*. . - :iave reasonable 
suspicion to detain Defendant in this manner. Because the manner in which Officer Edwards 
approached Defendant is factually equivalent to a normal traffic stop, all evidence discovered 
as a result of this illegal detei ition must be si lppi essed. 
Even if the Court were to find that the manner in which Officer Edwards blocked 
Defendant's vehicle and approached Defendant late at night is not sufficient to constitute a 
'k n ' d ti\i) slop ' iluj niniiicni itui OII'HH hjwaids seized DetfMuliUit's idenfificilinn .null 
returned to his patrol vehicle to run a warrant check, Defendant was seized within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment without question. 
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If an officer has effectuated a level two stop, the officer may permissibly run a 
warrants check so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention beyond that 
necessary for the original stop. State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994). However, 
if a police officer has not effectuated a level two stop, expecting a person to remain while the 
officer conducts a warrant check is a level two stop requiring reasonable suspicion. State v. 
Johnson. 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). The Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme Court 
stated in the Johnson case that a seizure occurred "when [the officer] took [defendant's] name 
and birth date and expected her to wait while he ran a warrants check."Jd, at 763. Therefore, 
notwithstanding the initial blocking of Defendant's vehicle, a level two encounter requiring 
reasonable suspicion occurred at the time Officer Edwards seized Defendant's driver's license 
and expected Defendant to wait in his vehicle while he ran a warrant check. Therefore, all 
evidence found as fruit of the unconstitutional stop of Defendant must be suppressed. 
For all of the reasons set forth above, Defendant respectfully requests the Court to 
suppress all evidence seized as a result of the unreasonable stop and detention of Defendant. 
DATED this ^ Q day of March, 1998. 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
the Utah County Attorney, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this "VO day o t 
/ ^ V X N . 1998. 
Randall K. Splicer 
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IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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Defendant 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
FOR THE DEFENDANT 
CURTIS L. LARSON 
DEPUTY UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 East Center, #2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
RANDALL K. SPENCER 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
245 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
I N D E X 
WITNESSES 
ROGER EDWARDS 
Direct examination by Mr. Larson 
Cross-examination by Mr. Spencer 
Redirect examination by Mr. Larson 
E X H I B I T S 
EXHIBIT NO 
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PRO VI" , UTAH ; API-" 1 L ,.' ,„ J 0 "'. J A I -"I . 
P R 0 0 E E I' I IJ G S 
THE C 0 U R T ' LJ e s e a t: e • 1 „ p 1 e a s e " s 
ioi4 0 o 4 3 3, state of Utah vs. Green, 
Okay, counsel , 
MR. LARSON: The state Is ready tc • proceed,, 
your Honor, 
THE COURT: Is the defendant ready? 
MR. SPENCER: Yes, your Honor, 
THE COURT: All right. You may proceed. 
MR. LARSON: Thank you your Honor, The 
St:a.te w uail officer Edwards. 
THE COURT: T * " ^ ' n 1 come f ^ r w a ^ r l arid r a ; . 
r U l C i K W-LX-L a d l l i i h j - S L c x wi l t ; w ~ w *. 
y o u . 
ROGER EDWARDS, 
called a.s a w11ness by the P1 aint i f £ was duly 
l u i i u W S : 
THE CLr, k : " s o l e m n . 1 y s w e a r t h e 
t i f ' • - s o u L L u y i V e - L n t h e c a s e n o w 
p e n d i n g b e f o r e - - ;: - "our4" v i ] 1 u <? t u e f r v . f V t h e w h o .1 e 
t. i u i' ' u u L u n c u j - u L i i / o u n c i j o u G o d , 
THL W I T N E S S Y<~-
»Pj, p fvw.iPT |J|iirjll F! . i ±n t h e w i t n e s s c h a i r , 
p l e a s e . 
- " ~ " ' 13 n cry i Q n i ] A ^ o -» ^ p ^ 
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1 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. LARSON: 
3 Q. Will you state your name, please. 
4 A. Roger Edwards. 
5 Q. Where are you employed? 
6 A. Springville Police Department. 
7 Q. Were you employed with the Springville Police 
8 Department on January 3rd of this year? 
9 A. Yes, I was. 
10 Q. And on that date at approximately 10:30 p.m. 
11 were you on duty? 
12 A. Yes, I was, 
13 Q. While you were on duty, what were your 
14 responsibilities as a member of the Springville Police 
15 Department ? 
16 A. My responsibilities were to patrol, respond 
17 to calls, protect and serve the public. 
18 Q. While you were on duty and at approximately 
19 that time, did you observe a vehicle parked in an LDS 
20 church parking lot? 
21 A. Yes, I did. 
22 Q. And could you describe that vehicle to the 
23 Court? 
24 A. The vehicle was an older model -- I believe 
25 it was an older model Chevy two-door, maroon or dark 
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red i n r: . r 
Q
 # Were there other vehicles in the parking 1ot ? 
A. No there were r, 
w # i n relation to the church building itself,, 
where was this vehi c J e ..located? 
A . it was pa i: k e d i >n the sout h side o f t h e c h u r c h 
a t the far south e n 11 u I: the par k i 11 |,j L","" L . 
Q . Can yo u give a distance between the b u 11d i n g 
and the vehi r ., - . 
i wuuiJ have to guess. An approximation 
*" " T r c h a h "1 v ] ppp *" h ^  *" i fl fl "F p <=> t . W C L 
L u e i c wcj-c nu wuxxwo. v e h i c l e s in the 
parking lot ? 
No„ ' ,eie weic auL 
How wa s 
, i 
- ^ v o ^  
far south end 
a i w .1" I" V 
•c Vs ^ ^ *^  •- v-i o T» a r k i n o 
jjaiLiaixj' i u L u u. ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  w .^  the 
rlr" r> r* n ^  *~ T t W3? n '^  a c t ua 1 1 v 
^ ± . it was partwa y i n the 
i" rarked A"* n a s t a 1 ] 
Q . l l l C d l i u i l , < a l c 
bac;< a*a> r* r* >.::-*• — "^u"!^ ~-
A . '" uiiciL. 
indicating it was 
e curb? 
Q. Okay V» *-s ^ f V» ft v ier s ide o£ the 
25 . A. . 0 n t h e o t he r s id e o f t he curb w a s a fence and 
TT ,J r
~~ ~"~ ' r» « -i ^  4 9 q 1 0 R 0 
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Okay. How was the vehicle facing, the front 
The front of the vehicle was facing south. 
Was it facing towards the parking lot or the 
A. It was facing towards the fence. 
Q. Did you decide to make contact with the 
vehicle? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. So you drove into the parking lot? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Did you observe anybody in the vehicle? 
A. I could tell that there was one occupant 
inside the vehicle. 
Q. What position in the vehicle did that one 
person occupy? 
A. They were in the driver's seat. 
Q. Could you tell if it was a male or female 
A. I could not. 
Q. --at that time? 
A. At that time I could not. 
Q. As you approached the vehicle, did you use 
any lights on your vehicle? 
A. No, I did not . 
6 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, CSR (801) 429-1080 
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Q . Y o ii i"> Jo v i o i,i ;-i 1 y 11 a d y <') u r h e a d l i g h t s o n . 
A . H e a d l i g h t s on. T h a t ' s c o r r e c t 
Q . D i d ;r :: n i p a :i : II :;: n e a r 11 I e v e h i c l e ? ' 
A I d:I • lii I parked behind and to the right of 
L Ij t € 3 ea > :ii n g <= ,. g:i :• s • a 1: d e a 1 • a i b U u c e between 
my vehicle and the suspect vehicle. 
Q A p p i: • ::> x :i i: i: i a t e 1 } 1: I • :: • A i: in i i :: 1 i • ::! Wdb between 
/*.-*. r:. M - i: . ? suspect '•' 
A . E l l ' i t i - * t . 




 a t e d Mi a, t: L h e v e h i c l e • • - - n o t 
Q Wl ia I " ; a s L Ii t 1 ,i a t an « t-.1 „, i i u rn ', > i u i: , . • 
r e c o l l e c t ! o n , froni t h e c n i"b I: o t h e E r o n t c • f t h i s o t h e r 
v e h i c l e ? 
A. Approximate! y ] 0 feet 
Q W h e n y o u p a i: k e ;ii y i) u :t e h i : 1 e :i i i 1:1 I e p a r k i n g 
lot , d i d y o u shine the 1 i g h t s i n t o t h i s o I: h e i: v e h i c . e 
y o u r h e a d l i g h t s ? 
A. My h e a d l i g h t s w e r e shine d o n t h e i e h i c l e , 
yes 
2 5 
^. Did you use a spot 1 Igh t a t all? 
* NO
 r 1 (1 I i/l I'M' i i 
*. Is your vehicle equipped w ith a spo11ight ? 
A. Yes, it is . 
Vonda Bassett , R i- R , «. S h ( K " l » 4 2^ • I u n 
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1 Q. And you could have used that spotlight to 
2 illuminate the interior of the vehicle? 
3 A. No, I could not. The spotlight was broken. 
4 Q. You didn't use any of your emergency lights, 
5 red and blues? 
6 A. No, I did not . 
7 Q. Did you turn on any flashing lights? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. As you approached the vehicle and your lights 
10 were shining on the vehicle, what did you see the 
11 occupant in the vehicle doing? 
12 A. The occupant in the vehicle was moving around 
13 a lot. He wasn't like sitting in one place. He would 
14 lean to one side or to the other. You could see his 
15 arms were moving. Pretty much that was it. He was 
16 moving around in the vehicle as I approached. 
17 Q. Is it standard procedure for police officers 
18 to call in license plate numbers and things, 
19 descriptions, when they make contact with vehicles? 
20 A. That is correct. 
21 Q. Did you do that in this particular case? 
22 A. Yes, I did. 
23 Q. While you were observing the license plate, 
24 did you notice anything about the license? 
25 A. I noticed that the license plate was -- I 
8 
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You made c r. i. A . .. v. . :.e i' 
ea . 
_q .' .. i J ,, ., 1 <j 
A. J LI 1 i J . 
Q. H ow did you «1 * • that 
A " • i J 1 1 i  i i i I i > uuu i and 
- - 1 T o A t a p p e d on t h e w i n d o w , " I,1 h e i i I d i v i d u a l s i o wn 
the door dc AMI I r i i a d h ' i; c»n t a < 1 i s k e d him i ne was 
oka 1 I u s e d m y f: l a s h 1 i g h t I: o I o o k i n t o t h e a a r t o 
see i f I c o i J ] d i t J (:•:' V I I I 1 1 lid i v i iJ a ci I nid , h a ve b e e n 
doing as I was approaching. 
n
 D 1 d yj O U 1*1 U , •".' M i l ti I J (.) IK I \ I I I i I 1 1 U " t | Hi (-' \ i U 
d e c x u ^ - t (i make contact that he was c r t h i i:- i ridividua 1 




/ t n a n v 
No, I did no t. 
Wha *• wap f he pu , . 
1 r a i p u r p o s e s 
- o 
.Kir.c t h e 
One was a wt . : r t 
e * • 2
 a t e r j_ n t ^  e e v enl-Ajt^ m ^ _ 
q u a r t e r after i ^  G O T WPP. • 
i n d i v i d u a I to make s u i* e h e w ri s i k a v' 
a t. leas t a 
e , i " II 1 1 I f T =>lso 1J a 1 I a k e n d 
m i n utes earlier i • c d br o k e n w i udow a p p r o x i m a t e ] } t v., : 
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leaving that general area, or if possibly the person 
in that vehicle may have been involved in the broken 
window. 
Q. Now, you indicated that you spoke with the 
individual? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Could you explain to the Court how you first 
approached, the language that you used, the tone of 
voice that you used in making contact with that 
individual? 
A. When I first approached him, I used very --
what I felt was a very calm voice in talking to him. 
I asked him if he was okay. I waited approximately 
somewhere between 45 and 60 seconds for any type of 
response from the individual. When he responded, he 
asked if he was doing anything wrong. I told him that 
he was not doing anything wrong; I was just checking 
to see if he was okay. 
I also asked the individual if he had seen 
anyone come through the parking lot in the last couple 
of minutes. And the individual's response was, "I was 
just listening to my radio." So I again repeated the 
question. 
Each question that I asked there was a delay 
in the amount of time it took for the individual to 
10 
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to turn his head a fair amount to actually look at 
you, like look over his shoulder? 
A. Yeah, he would have had to. 
Q. You indicated that his movement seemed to be 
slow. Could you describe those a little more? 
A. I asked the individual if he had any I.D. 
that he could show me. And again a slight delay, and 
then he responded, "Yes." I watched the individual 
slowly reach back to his pocket and pull out his 
wallet. He was moving very slowly. He opened the 
wallet, fumbled for his driver's license, which was --
I could see it was actually right on top. 
As he pulled the license out, it was very --
he was having trouble keeping hold of the license. 
When he handed it up to me, he handed it up about this 
far. He didn't actually turn and hand it to me. I 
had to reach down into the vehicle to take the license 
from him. 
Q. And as you observed the individual and spoke 
with the individual and listened to his responses, did 
you cultivate a concern with regard to his being in a 
vehicle? 
A. Yes. With the slow responses he was giving, 
I was concerned that there may be a possibility that 
the individual was driving under the influence. While 
12 
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on Mr. Green. Within a minute I was notified that 
Mr. Green had two warrants on statewide. 
Q. And you arrested the individual based on 
those warrants? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And then there was a search of the vehicle 
after that? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And after that you found evidence of a 
controlled substance, possession and drug 
paraphernalia? 
A. Thatfs correct. 
Q. Were you asked to provide a diagram of how 
the vehicles were positioned? 
A. Yes, I was, 
Q. Do you have that in court today or a copy of 
that in court today? 
A. Yes. 
MR. LARSON: May I approach, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. LARSON: May I mark this? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. SPENCER: No objection. 
MR. LARSON: We!d request the Court accept 
Exhibit No. 1, which is the diagram the officer was 
14 
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1 police officer? 
2 A. I was a military police officer for three 
3 years. I've been employed as a police officer for the 
4 State of Utah just under a year. 
5 Q. So essentially then you have four years of 
6 experience as a police officer? 
7 A. That's correct. 
8 Q. And you've been through POST or something 
9 equivalent to POST, I presume. 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Did you go through the POST in Utah or did 
12 you do that through the military? 
13 A. I went through both. 
14 Q. So you've actually been through two POSTs? 
15 A. That's correct. 
16 Q. So you would consider yourself then a 
17 professional police officer; correct? 
18 A. Yes, I would. 
19 Q. And in the training you've received at both 
20 POSTs you certainly were trained on the importance of 
21 writing reports; correct? 
22 A. That's correct. 
23 Q. And perhaps that training included emphasis 
24 on the fact that your reports would be relied upon by 
25 both the prosecution and also the defense in 
16 
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1 were shined on the vehicle, yes. 
2 Q. Even though you're offset, your lights are 
3 shining directly through the back window and into the 
4 vehicle; correct? 
5 A. More at an angle because it was offset. 
6 Q. At an angle or straight on, they were shining 
7 directly into the vehicle; correct? 
8 A. Yes, some of the light was shining into the 
9 vehicle, but the whole vehicle was not illuminated. 
10 Q. Even with the angle, the lights were shining 
11 in the vehicle such that you could see the head of the 
12 occupant of the vehicle; correct? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. So the lights, therefore, were shining at 
15 least onto the hand of the occupant of the vehicle? 
16 A, That's correct. 
17 Q. And then after you stopped behind the 
18 vehicle, you called dispatch and checked on the 
19 license plate; is that correct? 
20 A, I called on the license plate in. I did not 
21 ask for registration information. It's standard when 
22 you stop for any reason to call the license plate in 
23 on a vehicle. 
24 Q. So at that point in time then, you did not 
25 check on the registration information? 
18 
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vehicle? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And did that confirm what you observed from 
the sticker that it had not been registered for two 
years? 
A/ Yes. 
Q. Did you determine who the vehicle was 
registered to? 
A. I do not recall the actual name of the 
individual it was registered to, but it was not 
registered to Mr. Green. 
Q. After you stopped behind the vehicle, how 
long would you say you parked there observing the 
circumstances before you felt it safe for you to 
alight from your vehicle and approach the subject 
vehicle? 
A. I'm sorry. 
Q. How long did you stay in your patrol car 
after you parked behind Mr. Green's vehicle? 
A. I exited my vehicle as soon as I stopped and 
placed it in park. 
Q, Okay. And then you approached with your 
flashlight? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you use that flashlight for officer 
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1 safety purposes; is that correct? 
2 A. Thatfs correct. 
3 Q. In your training at POST and other training, 
4 you've been trained that effective use of the 
5 flashlight for officer safety is to shine that 
6 flashlight directly into the face of a suspect so that 
7 essentially their vision is hampered to a degree; 
8 isn't that correct? 
9 A. No, that's not correct. I was never taught 
10 to shine my flashlight in a suspect's eyes. 
11 Q. Is that not the procedure that you followed 
12 that evening is to shine the flashlight on Mr. Green's 
13 eyes as you approached him? 
14 A. No, it is not. 
15 Q. Where did you shine the flashlight, then? 
16 A. Inside the vehicle. I did shine my 
17 flashlight on Mr. Green while he was searching through 
18 the vehicle, but I did not shine the flashlight into 
19 Mr. Green's face. 
20 Q. So you stopped, as you described earlier, I 
21 guess, just behind the driver's side door of the 
22 vehicle; is that correct? 
23 A. That's correct. 
24 Q. And from that point in time you took the 
25 flashlight and you shined it all through the vehicle, 
21 
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1 including on Mr. Green? 
2 A. That's correct. 
3 Q. And did you do that before you initiated any 
4 quest ioning of Mr. Green? 
5 A. No, I did that the while I was talking to 
6 Mr. Green. 
7 Q. While you were talking to him? 
8 A. Thatfs correct. 
9 Q. Now, Ifd like you to look over at that 
10 beautiful picture on the wall. Okay? 
11 A. Okay. 
12 Q. And now I'd like you to respond to this 
13 question in the same length of time that it took 
14 Mr. Green to respond to your first question. 
15 MR. LARSON: Objection, your Honor. That 
16 would be improper. We don't have the same 
17 circumstances that we had on the night of the 
18 incident. 
19 THE COURT: I don't think that demonstration 
20 is of any value, counsel. If you want to ask him how 
21 long and in what direction, you can do that. 
22 MR. SPENCER: Your Honor, I just think that 
23 his guesstimate of 45 to 60 seconds is a mighty long 
24 time. I guess you ruled. I've learned that lesson 
25 before. 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SPENCER: So pardon me for forgetting my 
lessons of the past. 
Q. (BY MR. SPENCER) Officer Edwards, you 
testified under direct examination that it took 45 to 
60 seconds for Mr. Green to respond; isn't that what 
your testimony was? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Isn't it true that that's probably a little 
longer than it actually took? 
A. No, it took him a very long time to respond 
to my question. 
Q. Okay. When you're asking somebody a question 
and waiting for a response, would you not agree with 
me that sometimes seconds can seem like hours? 
A. Yes, I would agree with that. 
Q. Okay. You asked him quite a number of 
questions, didn't you? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And however long it took, he responded to all 
of them, didn't he? 
A. He responded with an answer, yes. 
Q. Yeah. Okay. So you approached his vehicle 
and you asked him if everything was all right; 
correct? 
2 3 
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A. That ' s correct . 
Q. And in your report you indicated that he was 
slow in answering; correct? You did not indicate that 
it took him 45 to 60 seconds, did you? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. There's a huge difference between being slow 
in answering and 45 to 60 seconds; would you not agree 
with me? 
A. I would say there's a difference, but slow 
doesn't have a time put on it. 
Q. I'd agree with you there. But you did not 
put in your report that it took him 45 to 60 seconds 
to answer your first question, did you? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. And then after he answered your first 
question, he asked you if he was doing anything wrong; 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you told him that he wasn't; you just 
wanted to see if he was all right. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You didn't have any reason to suspect when 
you approached his vehicle that there was a threat to 
life or limb? 
A. At any time you approach a vehicle, you have 
2 4 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, CSR (801) 429-1080 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to assume that there may be. 
Q. On the part of Mr. Green, you didn't suspect 
that there was any threat to life or limb prior to you 
approaching the vehicle; correct? 
A. I!m not sure I understand your question. 
Q. You had no reason to suspect that there was a 
threat of life or limb when you approached Mr. Green's 
vehicle, did you? 
A. When you approach any vehicle, you have to 
assume that there can be a threat. 
Q . Okay. 
A. You don't relax and not take the necessary 
safety precautions. 
Q. You're talking about officer safety; correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. I'm talking about Mr. Green. You had no 
objective, indicia of circumstances, that led you to 
believe that there was a threat to Mr. Green's life or 
limb when you approached the vehicle; correct? 
A. To Mr. Green? I thought you said from 
Mr. Green. 
Q. No, for him. 
A. Okay. The only thing that led me, you know, 
to do a welfare check on Mr. Green was the fact that 
he was, you know, alone in a parking lot late in the 
25 
'»-«« J - ^ ^ « « « * - * - "nn-o n r n f o r\ -y \ AnQ-ir\QC\ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 evening. 
2 Q. So the answer to my question then would be 
3 no, you did not have any reason to suspect that there 
4 would be a threat to life or limb? 
5 A. I had some reason, enough that I felt it was 
6 necessary to stop and check on his welfare. 
7 Q. Okay. You're not answering my question. My 
8 question is did you have any reason to think that 
9 there was a threat to his life or limb at the time 
10 that you approached his vehicle? 
11 A. Did I know that there was something wrong 
12 with Mr. Green at that time? No, I did not. 
13 Q. After Mr. Green asked you if he was doing 
14 anything wrong, you told him that he wasn't; correct? 
15 A. That's correct. 
16 Q. And then you asked Mr. Green who the vehicle 
17 belonged to; correct? 
18 A. Yes, that is correct. 
19 Q. And he said that his brother had just given 
20 it to him for Christmas? 
21 A. That's correct. 
22 Q. In your report you didn't indicate that he 
23 was slow to respond to that question, did you? 
24 A. No, I did not. 
25 Q. And then Mr. Green asked you if he was on 
2 6 
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private property; correct? 
A . That's correct. 
Q. And you again told Mr. Green that he was 
doing nothing wrong and that you were just checking to 
see if he was all right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And then you told him that you were also 
wondering why the vehicle's registration was expired 
by a couple years? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So at this point in time he was on private 
property, so that actually wasn't an offense you could 
cite him for? 
A. That•s correct. 
Q. Then you asked Mr. Green if he had seen 
anyone coming through the parking lot in the last few 
minutes; correct? 
A. That f s correct. 
Q. And he said that he was just sitting there 
listening to the radio? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And then you asked again if he had seen 
anyone, and he answered, "No"; correct? 
A. That f s correct. 
Q. And then at this point in time you asked if 
27 
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1 he had any I.D. that you could see; correct? 
2 A. That's correct. 
3 Q. And he answered, "Yes"; correct? 
4 A, Yes. 
5 Q. So all of the answers to your questions were 
6 logical, correct, and coherent? 
7 A. I didn't really feel that the answer of just 
8 listening to his radio was a necessarily logical 
9 response to the question. I didn't ask what he was 
10 doing. I had asked if he had seen anyone. 
11 Q. Okay. You then asked Mr. Green if he would 
12 mind if you went back to his car and checked a few 
13 things? 
14 A. Back to my car. That's correct. 
15 Q. And Mr. Green said, "Okay"? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. And then you went back to your car, and you 
18 checked his information for warrants; correct? 
19 A. That's correct. 
20 Q. And then you discovered warrants? 
21 A. That's correct. 
22 Q. And as you indicated in your report, 
23 Mr. Green was free to leave at any time up to the 
24 point that you found the information about the 
25 warrants; correct? 
-i- « ^ 4 . * .
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1 A. That's correct. 
2 Q. However, you indicated if he was to leave the 
3 church parking lot in his vehicle, he would have been 
4 stopped once he was on the street because of the 
5 expired registration? 
6 A. Thatfs correct. 
7 Q. But I suppose he could have driven around in 
8 the church parking lot? 
9 A. He could have driven around. He could have 
10 walked out of the parking lot, anything like that. 
11 Q. And then you also indicated that he could 
12 also have left on foot at any time until you 
13 discovered the warrants? 
14 A. That's correct. 
15 Q. And also at no time did you tell Mr. Green 
16 that he could not leave until you arrested him on the 
17 warrants? 
18 A. That's correct. 
19 Q. So, clearly, then, until you found the 
20 warrants, it was your opinion that Mr. Green was free 
21 to leave; correct? 
22 A. I was a little concerned with his responses. 
23 But at that time I didn't necessarily have a reason to 
24 hold him, no. 
25 MR. SPENCER: That's all the questions I 
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have . 
THE COURT: Redirect? 
MR. LARSON: Yes, your Honor, just a couple 
of things. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
6| BY MR. LARSON: 
Q. Officer Edwards, you indicated that as you 
spoke with the individual Mr. Green -- I suppose we 
can refer to him as Mr. Green -- you thought there may 
be a problem with him being under the influence? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Would that have given you a basis to hold 
him? 
A. It could have, yes, but I didn't have --
necessarily have the training belt to say that he was 
under the influence of anything. It was at that time 
that I also was running the warrants that I had --
that I thought of calling for a DRE, a drug 
recognition expert, to look at Mr. Green. 
Q. Did you do that? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Because as soon as I got back to my vehicle 
and ran the checks, I was notified of the warrants on 
Mr. Green. So I didn't feel it necessary to pursue 
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that avenue because he would have been able to leave 
in his vehicle. 
3 I Q. So you had a concern? 
4 A. I had a concern, yes. 
5 Q. But you did not follow through with further 
6 investigation into that concern? 
7 A. No, I did not. 
8 Q. And you decided that you would not pursue 
9 that at what time? 
10 A. I guess there's two parts that made me decide 
11 that. One was the fact that I had the warrants on 
12 Mr. Green to arrest him on. And also when my 
13 supervisor responded to the scene and saw the address 
14 for Mr. Green, it came back to a Community Care Living 
15 Center for mentally disabled people where they can 
16 live on their own but still have some State people to 
17 look after them. So at that time I thought that his 
18 slow responses may be contributed to any type of 
19 disability that he may have. 
20 Q. Did you know that that address was to a 
21 developmental center? 
22 A. At the time I did not, when I saw the 
23 license. But I knew of the center. And when my 
24 supervisor informed me that that's what the address to 
25 the center was, that's when I assumed that that's what 
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1 his problems stemmed from. 
2 MR. LARSON: Thank you. Nothing further. 
3 MR. SPENCER: I suppose the Court could take 
4 judicial notice of the fact that your Honor sent him 
5 to that center. 
6 THE COURT: I have. 
7 MR. SPENCER: Found him guilty and mentally 
8 ill and ordered him to be placed there. I don't have 
9 any further questions. 
10 MR. LARSON: Nothing further. 
11 THE COURT: You may step down. 
12 Any other witnesses? 
13 MR. LARSON: No, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Anything from the defendant? 
15 MR. SPENCER: No, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Do you wish to submit it or do 
17 you wish to have argument, counsel? 
18 MR. LARSON: The State would like to argue 
19 briefly, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. LARSON: Under Terry and a litany of 
22 cases that have come after Terry, it has been 
23 established that there are three levels that an 
24 officer can have contact with general citizenry. 
25 The first level, of course, is a purely 
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1 voluntary contact. According to State vs. Deedman, an 
2 officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose 
3 questions so long as the citizen is not detained 
4 against his or her will. 
5 A level two stop, here again under Deedman, 
6 is an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 
7 articulable suspicion that the person has committed or 
8 is about to commit a crime. However, the detention 
9 must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to 
10 effect the purpose of the stop. 
11 Of course, the third, which is also involved 
12 in this case, is an actual arrest based on probable 
13 cause or in this particular incident a warrant that 
14 came about. 
15 Of course, we need to keep in mind that under 
16 a level one stop, according to State vs. Jackman, it 
17 must be a completely voluntary encounter, and a 
18 citizen may respond to an officer's inquiries but is 
19 free to leave at any particular time. Also in State 
20 vs. Trejillo, the Court said a seizure within the 
21 meaning of the Fourth Amendment does not occur when a 
22 police officer merely approaches an individual on the 
23 street and questions him if the person is willing to 
2 4 listen. 
25 A case in -- well, in State vs. Higgins, the 
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1 court indicated a person is seized under the Fourth 
2 Amendment when considering the totality of the 
3 circumstances the police conduct would have 
4 communicated to a reasonable person that the person 
5 was not free to decline the officer's request or 
6 otherwise terminate the encounter and go on with his 
7 or her business. 
8 If we look at this particular circumstance 
9 and the facts surrounding the circumstance, we've got 
10 an officer on general patrol. He sees a vehicle in 
11 the late evening in the church parking lot. It's not 
12 pulled into a parking stall. It's somewhat out of 
13 place. It's about ten feet - - as the officer 
14 testified and as is diagramed, it indicates about ten 
15 feet away from the curb. The officer also had just 
16 recently taken a report on a broken window nearby. He 
17 decides that he's going to make contact with this 
18 individual. 
19 He testified on the stand that he had no 
20 indication whatsoever that this particular individual 
21 was involved in criminal activity, so his purpose in 
22 making contact with the officer was just solely to 
23 find out if he was okay, if everything was all right 
24 with the individual, and to ask if he might have been 
25 a witness to a criminal event that took place just a 
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1 little time prior to that. 
2 As he pulled into the parking lot, he 
3 positioned his vehicle -- the diagram is clear he 
4 positioned his vehicle, and the testimony is clear, 
5 about 20 to 25 feet behind the vehicle. And then, of 
6 course, the vehicle was ten feet from the curb, giving 
7 the vehicle nearly 30 feet of free space to maneuver, 
8 if he wanted to maneuver, the vehicle at the time the 
9 officer was making the check -- making the contact. 
10 The officer at no time used his emergency 
11 lights to indicate there was a stop ensuing. He used 
12 no spotlights. He did, of course, have his headlights 
13 on and positioned in such a way that it didn't shine 
14 directly into the vehicle, but it shined into the 
15 vehicle enough to where he could see the individual 
16 was there and what he was doing. 
17 The officer alights from his vehicle, makes 
18 contact with the individual, and at that time finds 
19 that the defendant is extremely slow. Now, granted 
20 the State will, of course, stipulate that the 
21 defendant does have some difficulties in that regard. 
22 However, the officer at the time -- and we have to 
23 look at the time of this incident. The officer had 
24 never met Mr. Green before and did not know of his 
25 medical circumstances or his mental circumstances at 
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the time. And so as he approached, his response was, 
"There's obviously something going on here." 
Even though the officer decided not to pursue 
the circumstances, it raised the suspicion level of 
the officer at least to a level two stop. He had gone 
from a level one to a level two stop as he conversed 
with the individual, Mr. Green, and obtained from him 
his driver's license. 
Now, according to all the case law that's 
come from Terry, as soon as an officer has a 
suspicion, a reasonable suspicion, that there may be 
some crime afoot, he has the right under the law and 
under Terry and under the constitution to seize that 
individual and perform certain checks. 
State vs. Lopez specifically held that a 
warrants check could be done on an individual that's 
being detained on a level two stop. And in this 
particular case the officer initiated a level one, 
immediately went to a level two as he discussed and 
conversed with the individual. And then because of 
that, obtained the driver's license, some 
identification, went back to his patrol car, went back 
to his car, and found out there were warrants on him. 
And then it went to a level three circumstance. 
If we look at it from the standpoint also 
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that the defendant was asked if it would be okay for 
the officer to make some checks, the defendant said it 
would be okay that the officer go back and make these 
particular checks after he obtained his driver's 
license. So we have a voluntariliness involved in 
this . 
And in State vs. Pattafield, which is a 1996 
case, the court in an analogous type of circumstance 
took a level two traffic stop down to a level one 
circumstance because of the voluntariliness of the 
defendant in the matter which was just simply he 
decided to repair a broken light on his vehicle at the 
behest of the officer. He did not have to do it at 
that particular time. But because of that 
circumstance, there were other incriminating evidence 
or material that came out. And a subsequent charge 
came from that, and the court held that that was okay 
based on the voluntariliness of the defendant. 
So our argument would be, your Honor, that we 
started with a level one stop of the defendant. And 
as soon as the officer made contact with the 
individual, he noticed the mental problems that were 
going on. That switched his thinking to there may be 
a possibility of a DUI or somebody under the influence 
of alcohol being in possession or actual physical 
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1 control of a motor vehicle. In the state of Utah, 
2 that's a violation of state law. And then he obtained 
3 the license from the individual, ran a check, found 
4 there were warrants, and then the arrest took place. 
5 Based on that, we submit to the Court that 
6 the motion to suppress should just basically be 
7 denied. Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Spencer. 
9 MR. SPENCER: Your Honor, at the expense of 
10 the court suspecting me of looking at cases through 
11 rose-colored tinted glasses, I think this is probably 
12 one of the most clear cut suppressions I've ever 
13 argued before your Honor. If it were only the 
14 blocking issue, then it would be a close call in my 
15 opinion based upon the case law, if we had to 
16 differentiate between whether he would actually have 
17 had to maneuver back and forth once or twice or 
18 whatnot to get around the vehicle. That would 
19 certainly be something that the Court would have to 
20 consider and determine from the circumstances whether 
21 or not the partial blocking, as the officer has 
22 described, would be sufficient to constitute the 
23 equivalent of a stop. 
24 However, this case becomes patently clear by 
25 the case law that it rose to the level of a level two 
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stop at the point in time when the officer asked for 
Mr. Green's I.D., took that I.D., and went back to his 
vehicle to check on it. State v. Johnson is exactly 
on point where there is not a level two -- let me 
rephrase that. Where there is not reasonable 
suspicion to support a level two stop, the officer 
hasn't engaged in a level two stop. And when he asks 
to check for I.D., then State v. Johnson clearly held 
that that was the equivalent of a level two stop and 
requires reasonable suspicion. 
The testimony of the officer before the Court 
today was clear that Mr. Green was free to leave at 
any point in time up until he found the warrants. So 
he was clearly acting under the pretenses of a level 
one stop. And just because the State comes in now and 
tries to change things and create the possibility that 
there was reasonable suspicion is irrelevant. 
I forget the name of the case, but I read it. 
I know that there's a case out there that states that 
it's the officer's intent at the time -- your Honor 
probably knows it. But it's the officer's intent at 
the time that is the focus of the Court in evaluating 
this type of issue. 
In this case it's clear that the officer's 
intent was to conduct a level one stop. Perhaps 
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1 unbeknownst to the officer when he took Mr. Green's 
2 I.D., returned to his vehicle to do a warrant's check 
3 that heightens the intent to a level two stop. He did 
4 not have reasonable suspicion at the time of stop, 
5 according to his testimony. And, therefore, 
6 basically, the matter should be suppressed. 
7 Oh, one other thing I should address. 
8 Voluntariliness. That doesn't make a difference 
9 either. Once there's a level two stop, whether a 
10 person is cooperating with the level two encounter or 
11 whether they attempt to evade after being notified 
12 that they're expected to stay, is irrelevant. 
13 State v. Payfield is the case where there was 
14 a traffic stop. The business of the traffic stop was 
15 completed. A portion of the reason for the stop was 
16 the because a taillight's out on the vehicle. And 
17 after everything was all done, the driver of the 
18 vehicle wanted some help or wanted assistance after 
19 the traffic stop, so he continued to actually ask 
20 questions of the officer, which extended the presence 
21 of the officer there, which resulted in some further 
22 discovery, incriminatory evidence. Clearly different 
23 circumstances than the present case. I think the 
24 circumstances of the present case are clear, and the 
25 evidence should be suppressed. 
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THE COURT: The Court will take the matter 
under advisement, and I'll advise you of my decision 
in writing. At the waiver hearing I believe we simply 
set it for a suppression hearing and did not set it 
for trial; isn't that correct? 
MR. LARSON: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: In setting it for trial, I'm not 
making a decision as to my ruling on the motion, but I 
think to expedite the matter with the defendant in 
custody it would be appropriate to set it as soon as 
possible. One day? 
THE CLERK: Actually, we have April 22nd. 
MR. SPENCER: I have a trial set on that day, 
your Honor. I think we could set it on that day. I 
don't anticipate this is going to trial if your Honor 
rules against us. And it always makes me nervous when 
they set the trial --
THE COURT: As I said, the defendant is here. 
You're here. It just makes sense to set it rather 
than wait, whether I do or don't suppress. Is that 
date okay? 
MR. SPENCER: Yeah. 
MR. LARSON: Fine, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The 22nd at 9:00. Okay. Jury 
instructions would, therefore, be due on the 15th. 
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1 And I should be able to rule on this by next week. Do 
2 you want it set for pretrial? 
3 MR. LARSON: Yes. May as well set the 
4 whole -- you will not be holding calendar on the 10th, 
5 as I understand it. 
6 MR. SPENCER: Your Honor, I think we could 
7 advise the court in an informal pretrial what we're 
8 going to do rather than set it a day or two before the 
9 scheduled trial date. 
10 THE COURT: Well, we could probably -- how 
11 about a pretrial on the 21st? 
12 At what time? 
13 THE CLERK: 8:15. 
14 THE COURT: 8:15. 
15 MR. SPENCER: Okay. 
16 THE COURT: All right. That will be the 
17 order. And defendant is ordered to be present at the 
18 time set for pretrial as well as the time set for the 
19 trial. And Ifll try to get a determination on this 
20 next week so you'll know in advance. 
21 MR. LARSON: Thank you. 
2 2 THE COURT: Thank you. 
23 (Proceedings in the above-entitled 
24 matter were concluded.) 
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CASE NO. 981403433 
DATE: April 7, 1998 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: David Sturgill 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Having 
received and considered the Motion and a supporting memorandum, the Court hereby grants the 
Motion and delivers the following Decision. 
Statement of Facts 
On or about January 3, 1998, at approximately 10:30 P.M., Officer Robert Edwards of 
the Springville Police Department observed Defendant's vehicle parked in a private parking lot. 
The officer entered the lot, exited his patrol car and approached the driver's side of Defendant's 
vehicle. Defendant was seated in the driver's seat. As he approached the vehicle he observed the 
defendant "moving around a lot." The officer engaged Defendant in conversation, and noted that 
Defendant's responses to his questions were non-responsive and delayed. Officer Edwards asked 
Defendant for identification, and Defendant produced a driver's license. The officer returned to 
his patrol car, ran a warrant check, and discovered that Defendant had several outstanding 
warrants. The officer arrested Defendant, and subsequently found evidence of a controlled 
substance and drug paraphernalia in Defendant's vehicle. Defendant moves that this evidence be 
suppressed because it was discovered during an unlawful search and seizure. 
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Opinion of the Court 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated[.]" U.S. CONST, amend. IV. Although the expectation of 
privacy in a vehicle is less than that of a home, "one does not lose the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment while in an automobile." State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). 
In Utah a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment does not occur when a 
police officer simply approaches an individual on the street and questions him, if the person 
voluntarily responds, and is free to leave at any time. The Utah Supreme Court determined: 
"[A]n officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions so long as the citizen is not 
detained against his will." State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991). This type of police 
encounter, in Utah, is referred to as a "level one stop." Id. 
Officer Edwards observed Defendant's parked vehicle, entered the lot and parked his 
patrol car. The officer approached the driver's side of Defendant's vehicle and made contact with 
the defendant. At the preliminary hearing, the officer stated that at the time he decided to make 
contact with Defendant, he did not suspect that he was involved in any type of criminal activity. 
The officer stated further that he had two purpose in approaching the defendant. One purpose 
was to check the welfare of the defendant. The other, was to ask Defendant if he had seen 
anyone pass through the parking lot. Earlier that evening, Officer Edwards received a report of a 
broken window and was searching for suspects. 
Officer Edwards initially asked Defendant "if he was OK." Defendant responded by 
asking the officer if he was "doing anything wrong." The officer assured him that he was not, and 
then asked Defendant if "he had seen anyone come through the parking lot in the last couple 
minutes." Defendant responded: "I was just listening to my radio." This initial inquiry, clearly a 
level one stop, did not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure, and was therefore lawful. The 
defendant responded to the officer's questions voluntarily and there is no indication that 
Defendant wasn't free to leave. 
In contrast to the level one stop, u[w]hen a reasonable person, based on the totality of 
the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation with [an] officer's investigation, but 
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because he believes he is not free to leave a seizure occurs." State v. Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 87 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). This type of police encounter, in Utah, is referred to as a "level two stop," 
and must be justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See 805 P.2d at 763. Utah's 
court of appeals held: "[Detention for investigative questioning after the fulfillment of the 
purpose for the initial [interference]. . . is justified under the fourth amendment only if the 
detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity." State v. Robinson. 797 
P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In the present case, Officer Edwards took possession of the defendant's license and 
returned to his patrol car to run a warrant check. At that point, the initial encounter rose to a 
level two stop. In State v. Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant was "seized" 
when an officer "took [the defendant's] name and birth date and expected her to wait while he ran 
a warrants check." 805 P.2d at 762-763 (quoting State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989)). Similarly, Utah's court of appeals held in State v. Godina. 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992), defendants "were not free to leave because the deputy continued to hold their 
papers after he had satisfied himself that they were not intoxicated." In this case, Defendant was 
reasonable if he believed that he was not free to go while the officer ran the warrant check, and if 
he felt compelled to wait for the return of his license. Defendant was clearly seized within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The question is whether the seizure was based upon a 
"reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity." 797 P.2d at 435. 
Officer Edwards detained Defendant because the initial inquiry raised some suspicion 
that the defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. According to the officer, 
Defendant's responses were delayed and non-responsive. Officer Edwards stated: "Each question 
that I asked there was a delay in the amount of time it took for the individual to respond . . . [and] 
his responses weren't what I would consider normal responses to the questions[.]" The officer, 
however, did nothing further to confirm or deny his suspicion. He failed to administer a sobriety 
test or take any other action to determine whether the abnormal responses were the result of 
drugs or alcohol use, or something else. 
Without any other indication of criminal activity, the officer simply asked Defendant for 
his driver's license and permission to return to his patrol car to run a warrant check. This further 
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detention was unsupported by articulable facts that would lead a reasonable person to suspect that 
Defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. See Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
The Court concludes that Officer Edwards's detention of Defendant beyond the initial inquiry was 
not justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
Order 
Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby granted. 
DATED this X ^ d a y of April 1998. 
cc: Curtis L. Larson, Utah County Attorney 
Randy Spencer, Attorney for Defendant 
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